Certified: The ISACA AAISM Audio Course

In this episode, we move from watching vendor controls over time to proving, as best as you reasonably can, that a vendor’s A I security is actually real. Monitoring is about staying aware, but verification is about checking claims with structured methods and deciding what happens when expectations are not met. Beginners often assume that if a vendor is well known or has a polished website, that alone means their security must be strong. The reality is that reputation is not a control, and confidence without proof can lead to bad surprises. Verification gives you a disciplined way to reduce guesswork by using audits, tests, and contract enforcement as practical tools for building trust with evidence.

Before we continue, a quick note: this audio course is a companion to our course companion books. The first book is about the exam and provides detailed information on how to pass it best. The second book is a Kindle-only eBook that contains 1,000 flashcards that can be used on your mobile device or Kindle. Check them both out at Cyber Author dot me, in the Bare Metal Study Guides Series.

Verification starts with understanding what you are trying to verify and why the word matters. When you verify vendor A I security, you are checking that the vendor is protecting the systems, data, and model behaviors that could affect you. That includes the confidentiality of any data you share, the integrity of the model and its outputs, and the availability of the service when you need it. It also includes A I specific concerns, such as whether the vendor prevents training data leaks, protects model artifacts, controls access to prompts and logs, and manages how updates change model behavior. Verification matters because A I systems can create new kinds of risk, such as generating harmful outputs, exposing sensitive information in responses, or being manipulated through inputs. Even if you are brand new to cybersecurity, you can understand this as a simple truth: if your organization relies on a vendor, your risk depends on what that vendor does when nobody is watching.

Audits are one of the most common verification methods because they create a structured review of controls. An audit, in plain language, is a formal examination of whether controls exist, whether they are designed properly, and whether they are being followed. For vendors, audits often come in the form of independent assessments where a third party reviews the vendor’s security program and produces a report. The value of an audit is not that it proves perfection, but that it reduces uncertainty by checking a defined scope. For A I vendors, a useful audit is one that covers the services you use, the data paths involved, and the operational controls that keep the system safe over time. When an audit is vague or only covers unrelated parts of the business, it can create a false sense of security rather than real assurance.

A key beginner skill is learning to ask what an audit does and does not tell you. An audit usually tells you that at a particular time, under a particular scope, an assessor reviewed certain controls and found them to be in place or not. It does not guarantee that every system is secure, and it does not guarantee that no incident will ever occur. Audits also vary in depth, so some are more like high level program checks while others include stronger validation of operational evidence. This is why it matters to understand scope and timing. If the audit is old, or if it excludes the service you rely on, then its usefulness drops sharply, even if the vendor speaks confidently about it.

Testing is the second major verification method, and it complements audits by checking how systems behave under pressure or attack. Testing can mean different things, but the core idea is the same: instead of trusting a description of controls, you examine results from a controlled attempt to find weaknesses. In vendor relationships, testing often includes security assessments of the vendor’s platform, application testing, or evaluations of how the system handles misuse. In A I systems, testing can also include checking for behaviors like unexpected data exposure, unsafe output generation, or susceptibility to input manipulation that causes the model to break its intended rules. For beginners, it helps to think of testing as a safety inspection that tries to see whether the system fails in predictable ways, and whether those failures are detected and fixed responsibly.

Testing is powerful, but it also needs boundaries, because you are working with someone else’s environment. A mature vendor will have a clear process for how testing is requested, approved, and coordinated, and they will explain what kinds of testing are allowed. That might sound restrictive at first, but it is actually a sign that the vendor takes stability and safety seriously. If testing is totally forbidden without explanation, that can be a warning sign, especially for higher risk relationships. On the other hand, if testing is allowed, it should still be organized so it does not disrupt service or create accidental harm. Verification is not about chaos; it is about controlled checks that create confidence without creating new risk.

Contract enforcement is the third major verification method, and it is often the most overlooked by beginners because it sounds legal rather than technical. The contract is where expectations become enforceable, meaning it defines what the vendor must do, what they must share, how quickly they must notify you of incidents, and what happens when they fail. A contract can require the vendor to maintain certain controls, provide certain reports, support certain audits, or meet certain response timelines. It can also define rights like the ability to review documentation, the ability to request remediation, and the ability to terminate the relationship if risk becomes unacceptable. Contract enforcement matters because verification without consequences can become a polite conversation that never leads to improved security.

To understand contract enforcement, it helps to separate promises from obligations. Vendors can promise many things in marketing materials, but only obligations in the contract are binding. When you verify vendor A I security, you use the contract as a reference point for what should exist and what evidence should be available. If the vendor fails to deliver required evidence, that is not just an inconvenience; it is a signal that either the relationship is poorly governed or the vendor is not meeting commitments. Contract enforcement can be as simple as reminding the vendor of timelines and deliverables, or as serious as escalating, pausing integrations, or invoking termination clauses. Even without being a lawyer, a security practitioner needs to understand that contracts are part of risk control, because they create leverage to fix problems before they become disasters.

A practical challenge in verification is knowing what is reasonable to ask for. Beginners sometimes swing between two extremes, either accepting almost anything because they feel intimidated, or demanding unrealistic proof that no vendor can provide. The middle ground is to tie your verification requests to risk. If the vendor processes sensitive data, you need stronger assurance about data handling, access control, and monitoring. If the vendor’s A I outputs directly affect customers, you need stronger assurance about safety testing, misuse resistance, and change management. If the vendor is critical to operations, you need assurance about resilience, incident response, and continuity. Verification becomes reasonable when it is driven by what could go wrong and what you need to reduce that risk to an acceptable level.

Another beginner misconception is believing that a single audit report is the end of verification. Verification is not a one time stamp; it is an ongoing posture that adapts as services and threats change. A vendor might pass an assessment and later introduce a new feature that changes data flows, expands integrations, or alters the model’s behavior. A vendor might also change subcontractors, hosting environments, or internal processes, each of which can affect controls. Verification is most effective when it is periodic and event driven, meaning you verify at regular intervals and also verify when meaningful changes occur. This keeps your assurance aligned with reality rather than with the memory of what was true last year.

It is also important to understand that vendor A I security includes more than preventing hackers. Many A I risks come from misuse, misunderstanding, or unexpected model behavior. Verification should consider how the vendor reduces the chance that the model reveals sensitive information, produces harmful content, or behaves inconsistently in ways that damage trust. It should also consider how the vendor handles data used for training or fine tuning, especially whether customer data is used in ways customers did not expect. Beginners can think of this as checking both doors and guardrails: doors prevent unauthorized entry, and guardrails reduce harm even when people are authorized users who might make mistakes or push boundaries. A vendor that focuses only on traditional security while ignoring A I behavior risks may leave you exposed in ways that do not look like classic breaches but still cause real damage.

When verification identifies issues, the response should follow a calm, structured path. First, clarify what the issue is, whether it is a missing report, a failed test finding, or a contract requirement not met. Next, evaluate the impact and urgency, including whether data or safety is at risk right now. Then, agree on remediation steps and timelines, and ensure you receive evidence that remediation actually happened. Finally, consider whether the pattern suggests deeper problems, like weak governance or poor transparency, which might require stronger controls, tighter contract terms, or a different vendor. This approach keeps verification from becoming emotional or adversarial, and it keeps the focus on outcomes that reduce risk.

Another useful idea for beginners is that verification is a partnership with clear boundaries. You want vendors to succeed because you depend on them, but you also need to protect your organization and users. Audits and tests should be framed as normal expectations for a high trust relationship, not as accusations. Contract enforcement should be framed as maintaining agreed standards, not as punishment. When verification is done well, vendors often respond positively because it clarifies expectations and reduces confusion. When verification is avoided, small problems can grow until they become urgent crises, which is far more stressful for everyone involved.

By the end of this lesson, you should be able to explain vendor A I security verification as three connected practices. Audits provide structured, scoped assurance that controls exist and are operating. Tests provide evidence of how the system behaves when challenged, including A I specific failure modes that can hurt safety and trust. Contract enforcement turns expectations into obligations and gives you a way to drive remediation when gaps appear. Together, these methods make vendor relationships safer because they replace hope with proof and turn vague trust into managed, measurable risk.